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T I E S I S

-- O--

ON THE SUBIECT OF

DIVORCE LEGISLATION THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES

WITH

ESPECIAL REFEREICE TO NEW

Y0r: STATE,

EDWARD N. JACKSON,
O0RILrELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL,
1893.

The various schemes of divorce legislation
throughout the United States, are mostly original in the
respective states.

There is no uniformity in this

legislation, but on the contrary, each state sets up a
separate and independent system of positive rules according to its own theories.

These systems differ as to

the causes of divorce, and the jurisdiction of courts
over suits for divorce, by or against non-residents.
The result is confusion and uncertainity in this branch
of the law.

These differences have led to many con-

flicts of judicial decisions, so that a marriage is often
treated at the same time, in one state as dissolved, and
in another state, or country, as subsisting;

and a man

may be convicted of bigamy, or adultery, in one jurisdiction, upon what would be a lawful second marriage in
another.
Many evils exist by reason of the fact that
divorce may be obtained with ease in a number of the
states.

The courts are imposed upon by persons claim-

ing a boni fide residence, and asking that the court

9

exercise its jurisdiction to determire their status.
This abuse of the law, and imposition on the courts, can
only be corrected by voluntary state action.

This

inconsistency grows out of the rule of private international law which recognizes the rignt

of every sover-

eignty to declare the status of its citizens.

This is

one of the bad results of dividing sovereignty into parts,
and should be met by each state conceding a little to
the others, until there is but one theory.

The courts

are constantly asking for a greater unanimity in the
statute law of the various states and territories, and
until such a result is reached, in divorce legislation
at least we will have confusion.

.

Folger J. in the

Peo. vs Baker, 76 N. Y. p 78, in commenting on this
situation says: "The consequences of such want of harmony
in polity and proceeding, we have adverted to.

The

extent of them ought to bring in some legislative remedy.
It is not for the courts to disregard general and essential princilles, so as to give polliation.

Indeed, it

is better, by an adherence to the policy and law of our
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own jurisdiction, to make thu clash the more and the
earlier known and ielt, so that the sooner may there be
an authoritative determination of the conflict."
New York State took the initiative by asking
the several states and territories to send each three
commissioners to meet and discuss the lack of uniformity
of law in the United States with especial reference to
the law of Marriage and Divorce, and such commissioners
to make recommendations to their respective states
legislatures.

So far eight states have complied.

If

the movement is not successful and does not secure a
voluntary co-operation of the several states, the last
resort will necessitate an amendment to the United
States constitution, and thereby place these cases in
the United States courts.
favorably thought of.

Such a course has been quite
courts
If the United States,should get

Jurisdiction in these cases, it would produce better
results; there would be but one class of judges passing
on the law applicable to the situation, and it would
insure a like disposition of every similar case, whereas
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if the states should agreon one uniform law, there is
nothing to hold them to their agreement, and such an
arrangement will naturally, after a short trial, prove
it is not enforceable and the courts will gradually come
to disregard it.
Marriage, though in some of its aspects resembling a contract, it is rather to be regarded as a social
relation; a status with duties, and rights and obligations, established by the law of the stabe where the
parties have their domicile, not by that of the state
where the relation is formed, much less by that of their
own will and pleasure.

That the peculiar rights and

obligations of married persons arise, not from any
contract betwwen them, but by law, is seen from the
following facts: first, the obligations and rights of
husband and wife are not only mutual but also to and
against the comnunity.

(I Bish. M. and D. section 4.)

2These rights and obligations may be changed with a change
of residence, or by change of law.
3. Disregard of
no
these rights and duties gives right of action for damages

5
for breach of contract.

4. They may be put an end to

by divorce, although the contract was for life.
A marriage which is ggod by the laws of the
country where it is entered into, is valid in any country,
and although it should appear that the parties went into
another state with a view to evade the laws of there own
country, the marriage in the foreign state will nevertheless be valid in the country where the parties live.
Story says, wMarriage being in its nature, a contract
depending on the consent of the parties, it follows that
it is valid everywhere, if valid at the lex loci."
Several of the states and territories have
definitions
incorporated into their statutes of marriage;
in some eases conforming them to the usual and long
accepted definition that it is a civil contract, while
in others, evidently looking beyond the mere agreement
to marry and the solemnization or other act occuring at
the agreement, the more modern and apparently more
accurate view of the matter has been adopted, that
marriage is a status acquired by the parties thereto and
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by virtue of the contract which is executed by consummat i on.
Marriage is treated both as a sacrament and as
In Kansas the marriage sacrament may

a civil contract.

be regarded either as a civil ceremony, or as a religous
sacrament, but the marriage relation shall only be entered into, maintained and abrogated, as provided by law.
The New York statute provides that marriage shall be
considered therein as a civil contract and that the
parties must be capable of contracting, and must give
their consent.

That a state is not procluded froz.

regulating the marriage institution under any constitutional interdiction of acts impairing the obligations
a contract, or interfering with

private rights and

immuinities, the courts have frequently held.
State, 58 Ala. 100.

of

Green vs

Adams vs PaLmer, 51 Me. 480.

Frasher vs State, 3 Tex. app. 263.

Prohibiting marriage

to a particuliar person, or persons, and before a certain
reasonable age, or other prudential provision, looking
only to the interest of th) person to be benefited,
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and not in general restraint of mLrriage, will be allowed
and held valid.
Marriage is a status.

Status means the legal

poaition of a party in, or with regard to the rest of
the oommunity..A husband, or a ;ife, is in a special
position, just as an infant is, or a felon; so that if
man and woman desire to cohabit lawfully and to have
lawful offspring, they can do so, only by sanction of
the law.

The legal conditions make up a set of special

rules which are set to govern the marital relations and
regulrte

man and woman who lawfuliy cohabit-

, and

place, them in a special legal position toward the
com unity.
A marriage can only be dissolved by death, or
divorce.

Divorce is the dissolution by means other

than death, or the partial suspension, of tha marriage
relation.

Distinction should be made at the outset,

between a divorce and an annulment of a marriage.
Bishop says, "Adivorce suit is a civil proceeding founded
on matrimonial wrong, wherein the married parties are
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plaintiff and defendant, and tlie public or government,
occupies, without being mentioned in the pleadings, the
position of a third party, resulting in a triangular
and otherwise sui generis action of tort.
are the man, the woman, and the state.

The parties
It is the duty

of the court to taKe care of the interests of the state,
to prevent

decrees being granted where not permitted.

In Kanss and Indian

it

is

the duty of the Irosacuting

officer to oppose all suits for divorce, at least so far
that there can be no collusion.

This is done since

divorces are contrary to public policy, and to protect
the interests of children.

A divorce is more than a

Controversy between individuals, there are interests of
three parties intervening.*
An annulment of a marriage, is the setting
aside of the marriage on account of some imperfection
or illegality, which renders it void or voidable, and is
retrospective in operation; while divorce is wholly
prospective.

Annulment of nmrriage is always by judic-

ial proceedings, and although many marriages do not
regard the intervention of judicizl authority to set
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them aside, being declared by statute to be void without
legal proceedings, still such proceedings should usually
The court

be had.
Jhs.

said,

in
,nd

Ch. 341:"the fitness

Wightrn vs Wightrnwf,
propriety
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of a judicial

decision pronouncin; the nullity of such a marriage, is
very ap-.rent, .-nd is

-erel Y con.ductive to good order

and decorum, and to the peace and conscience of the
parties."
When marriage is dissolved by divorce and the
parties ara put back in the position of single persons,
except so far as their right to remarry is concerned,
the divorce is termed absolute -- ie, a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii, or fro, the bonds of marriage.

When marri-

age is only partially suspended by divorce and the
prties

bplurate,
ut still retain -lheir legal

are

status as

arried

persons, the divorce is called limit-

ed -- ie, a divorce a menso et thoro -- divorce fron bed
and board.
is

just

This divorce is g6-anted when the marriag.

-und Il ;,ful from the beginning,

andi therefore

the

law is tender of dissolving it, but

for some super-

venious

imj ossible for the

cause it

becomes

iw,,roper o',
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persons to live together.

This divorce is unknown in

some states, their statutes only providing for absolute
divorces.
Marriage may be dissolved by divorce in three
ways; first, by special acts of the legislature decreeing
a divorce to particuliar individuals.
this day, very unusual.

This mode is, at

(By act of Congress in 1886,

the legislatures of the territories of the United States
are prohibited from granting legislative divorces.

The

most of the states have a like provision, butthe custom
is still adhered to in Ala., Conn., N. H., and several
other of the states).

Second, by a court acting under

a general law, this is the usual procedure.

Third, by

operation of law without legislative or judicial proceeding for the purpose of securing a divorce -- i. e.
as in case of one imprisoned for life.
I have said that the statutory scheme of
original
A
within the
divorce in the United States, is
several states.

An examination of the procedure in

the early colonies supports this proposition.

The

first act authorizing expressly the dissolution of
marriage by Judicial decree in any dependency of the
English crown, was passed by the General court of Massachusetts in 1639; "that there be two courts of the
sizes yearly kept at Boston by the Governor, or Deputy
Governor, to hear and determine all causes of divorce.*
While the colony of New York was held by the Dutch, the
liberal divorce laws of Holland, of course, prevailed.
Divorces existed in New York after the English conquest
1664--1776.

In 1664 a statute provides in New York

"that where there is no knowledge of a husband, or a
wife, absent for five years after his or her departure,
nor of any that accompanied him or her in the voyage, it
apsent
may be Justly presumed that the /
person is dead,
and after that time, the other is free to marry.'
is still the law in New York.

This

Also a statute provided

that in all cases of adultery, all procedings shall be
according to the laws of Fmgland, which was by divorce
from bed and board.

In 1650 Rhode Island adopted a law

for a divorce which was absolute, for adultery at the
suit of the injured party.

In 1650, Conneticut
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adopted the Massachusetts law.

Desertion and adultery

were the recognized grounds for divorce.

It is evident

from these statistics that it was the practice of the
first settlers of some of the early colonies to grant
divorces to husbands and wives for the causes stated.
In 1773, George the Third issued instructions
to the governors of Quebec, Nova Scotia, Island of St.
John, Now hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Now York, New
Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and East Florida; *Whereas: we have thought fit
bp our Orders in Privy Counsel to disallow certain laws
past in some of our colonies and plantations in America
for conferring the privilege of naturalization on persons being aliens, and for divorcing persons who have
been legally joined together in Holy Marriage, it is our
expressed will and pleasure, that you do not upon Lny
pretence whatsomever, give your consent to any'decreeor
decreesthat may have been, or shall hereafter be passed
by the council and assembly of the provinces under your
government for the naturalization of aliens, nor for the
divorce of persons joined together in Holy Marriage.G.R.0

13
These instructions were not regarded in 2.assac-husetts, Rhode Island or Conneticut.
In Brutus vs Brutus, 1 Hop. Ch. 557, the court
said, *Our statutes are clearly original regulL:itions,
intended to authorize divorce in cases in which no
before
divorce could be obtained.
They define the causes for
which divorces shall be granted, they give jurisdiction
to those cases to this court, and they give no other
jurisdiction.

To consider these statutes as an adopt-

ion of the law of England, would be a violent perversion
of the language and intention of the legislatare.'
Prior to 1787, there was no tribunal in New
York authorized to grant divorces, candidates m st apply
to the legislature.

In that year an act was passed

declaring that the legislature should make general
provision, and giving power to the court of Chancery to
decree divorces for adultery.

An act was passed in

1813 giving wife the right to limited divorce for cruel
treatment.

This was extended to the husband in 1824.
The Catholics who settled Marylund retained

the rigid views of the Catholic church; so with the
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Episcopalians who settled Virginia and South Carolina.
The l&tter state has been especially distinguished for
its rigid rule in granting divorce for no cause whatand
ever.
This has produced a degrading influence , the
statutes of' that state now provide for the proportion of
a married man's property that goes to hi conooncubine
after his death.

On the other extreme, history shows

that the loose practice of disOlving marriage in the
Roman Empire, i. e. by the husband turning his wife
away, did not promote a higher morality.
Excepting in New York and South Carolina,

the

diversity of doctrine as to the causes of divorce, are
not material.

Absolute divorce can be granted for the

three causes; adultery, cruelty, and desertion.

Many

statutes gave the court power to say whether the particular divorce shall be limited or absolute to fit the
particular situation; so in the states of Delaware,
Xansa2; and Maryland.

The idea being where there is any

probability of a parttes relenting , or v'hcro the case
is

not an extreme one;

in

case it

interests of children, to place

is

better in

the

.he parties in a posit-
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this cannot be,

ion where they may become reconciled;

if

the coui't grants an absol'.ite div-rco,

sopai...ting them

forever from each othar.
The startes of Mas.ach'nsetts and 1,.1ne have an
All decrees shall,
become
absolute
in the first instance, be decrees nisi to A

admirable statutoinin this regard.

after the expiration of six months from the entering
thereof without further notice thereof b-, publication,
or otherwise, on the application of either party.
An interesting cori-espondence took place
betr ea Robert Owen of Indiana, and Horace Gjeeley in
1860; Horace Greiley, attacking the state of indiana for
its liberality in granting divorce, and Robert Owen
attacking New York on its strictness, and condermned the
practice of granting limited divorce and more separations.
M-. Greeley sustained the New York doctrine argueing that

New York followin7 the teachings, of the

l

("No man

shall put away his wife except foi- adulte'y." Mat. XIX
9.)defending limited divorces and seperations on the
ground of hunnity, that while a man and wozran are not
fit tocohabit, still neither one

i3 guilty enough to

necessit .te a divorce from the other.
stages
Owen azi Aeing ti.ut theAstagos of civilization
nece,:sitated a ch nge in the nurriage and divoroe institutions, that according to the Old Testament rore than
three thousand years ago, a divo:-ce law pe,'"itting a
husband to put away a wife whe:i sh

found no favor in

his eyes prevailed, and continued long. after Joseph and

Th3,t although Christ taught the doctrine
referred to, yet the change in civilization does not
warrarnt this strict doctrine and that if two people are
produceS
not proerly m;r--t

,

to bind them togethe-o

it

is

inhuman and

A

irmorality

by a bond of matrimony when they

ire unable to enjoy the fruits of a mnrriago.
I believe Mr.
u'gxrnlt.

Owen had the better side of the

Bills of separation and limited divorce in

effect,, zepa: te the parties from coh:.-bitation, but do
Such a
not lessen the marit:,l dutiers and obligations.
doct-inie cannot help but produce inmmorality and is
depriving the individual of all chances of ,. natural
existence.

In any light you aro bindinl

iown the

When

innocent

primary object,

L

marriage dods not result in its

i,tu-

nd wellfare of the

iai

then tho law should dissolve the relation

klrties,

absolutely,

ii'at all.

Divorces aro granted i'oi adulter,,
and desertion.

ertertained,

cruelty,

Those are essuntlially the only causes

but

i'o known by differei-t tcorrs under the

severtJl statutes.

Desertion coiprxoh, nds willful and

utt or dese rtion anyl

abnconmnt.

Cruulty comprehends

habitual in;'mljmrance, drunkeniss, extreme cruelty,
cruel and barbarous treatment; incJudino menlval and
physical cruelt .
Adu.tery is a voluntary sexu[*J ir"tercourse of
a

n1ma-ri JA person wiith anot.er not his, o i,

aushand.

The beliof of a nmriI-.d zrn t11

a divorc,

between him and his

riot the

103 ,is-. 572, 31,

. 70; but ilZ a lusbuna believes his wife; dad

and has subsequent
1 Blish.

there exists

,if, whe-n etrch is

aaze will not excuse hi i -dultery,
, rb

wife or

intercourse,

it

%.willnot

) adultery,

'14 and D sec. 710.
Desertion is

the wrongful determination by one
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party to a marriage of the cohabitation.

There rizust be

an intention to cease cohabitation and an entire absence
One
of consent on the part of the innocent party.
not
oan~be deserted while she or ho consents to the desertion,
Crowley vs Crowley 23 Ala 582.

The period of absence

from cohabitation varies in the different Jurisdictions
from one to seven years.

Statistics show that more

divorces were granted for desertion than for any other
cause.
Cruelty is the willful and persistent infliction of uneccesary pain and suffering, either in mind or
body, in such a way as to render cohabitation dangerous
and undesirable.

Bishop says, *Cruelty is such conduct

in one of the married parties as, to the resonable
apprehension of the other, or in fact, renders cohabitation physically unsafe to a degree justifying
drawal therefrom."

a with-

Mere mental anguish not enough

unless occasioned by apprehension of bodily harm.
Ruckman vs Ruckman 58 How. pr 278.
erson 88 Ill 248.

Henderson vs Hend-

But it has been held that a single

false accuasation of unchast ity warrants a divorce for
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cruel treatment;

62 Tex., Avery vs Avery 35 Kan., 1

Friend vs Friend 55 Mich 543.

.',
singrlue act of harsh

treatment does not constitute cruelty; Hoshl1,l
all 51 -Md 72.

vs Hosh-

A reasonable apprehension of injury is

sufficient, not necessary that the injury shall have
been accomplished; Gibbs vs Gibbs 18 Man 419.

The

courts in the various Jurisdictions are by no means
uniform on their acceptance of the term cruelty.

In

Pennsylvania and North Carolina there must be a cruel
and barbarous treatment endangering the life of the wife,
or such as to force her to leave her husband.

In new

York there must be such conduct as to render it unsafe
and improper for the parties to cohabit.

In Michigan

extreme cruelty, whether practiced by using personal
violence, or by other means.

in Massachusetts and

Maine cruel and abusive treatment.

.iany jurisdictions

do not allow a divorce to a husband for cruel treatment
by the wife.
Besides the denial of the acts complained of
and consistent with such denial, there are five defenses
to an action for divorce:
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First, Connivance or the complaintant's consent
to the acts complained of;
Second, Collusion, or the party's agreement to
make up the case for the purpose o& obtaining - divorce;
Third, Condonation, or the complaintant's
forgiveness of the acts complained of on conditions
performed by the defendant;
Fourth, Recrimination, or a cause for divorce
against the oomplaintant;
Fifth, Delay or limitation,
plainant has suffered a

or that the com-

reasonable limited time to

elapse since the commission of the acts complained of.
These defenses existed under the old ecclesiastical law and are recognized in the divorce courts
of the United States independently of sta i;ute.

The

Court of Appeals in New York has held that the defendant
may set up a counter claim of cruelty and inhumnn treatment, as against a complaint alleging adultery, also
that the defendant may allege adultery by way ol counter
claim where the divorce is sued for on the grounds of
cruel and inhuman treatment.

This is an unusual

doctrine.

A divorce granted under the laws and by the
constitutional

auithorities of the governinent,

oi' the

state where the parties are domiciled and whe 1e the
marriage contract was entered into, is valid and binding
everywhere.

Cheever vs Willson 9 Wal 108.

As to this

proposition there is no question, and it arises out of
the constitutional provision that each state shall give
faith to the acts, records and judicial proceedings
of the several other states, but this does not rio so far
as to mean that any divorce one state chooses to grant
must be held valid in all states; it only applies when
the court of the state had Jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and the parties as well.

A divorce to have

effect everywhere, must be one where the court has had
jurisdiction of the parties and their marriag a status.
For instance,

if

the parties to a marriage go to a

foreign state and one applies for a divorce and the other
makes only a pretence of defense, the judgement would
not be binding at the domicile of the parties.

In such

an instance it is only the community where the parties
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live that have an interest in their status, and that is
the only jurisdiction that can divorce them.
Hanover vs Turner 14 Iass 227, "If a citizen
of this country removes into another st.-te for the
purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife on a -round
which would not justify a divorce,in this state a divorce
so decreed is "iolly void in this conmon wealth."
This doctrine is differently expressed in 127
New York 413, wherein the court says, "The courts of the
United States and those of most of the several ststes
including ITew York and New Jersey, hold a divorce to be
valid so far as it effects marital status of the plaintiff, which is granted by the courts of a state pers,iant
to its statutes to one of its reuidclnt ciLiztns in an
action brought by such citizen, against a citizen residet
in another state, though the defendant neither &_ppears
in the action nor is personally served with process in
the state wherein the divorce is granted."

Williams vs

Williams 130 N. Y. 199.
In delaware, Maine, --nd iiassachusetts,

it

is

provided that when an inhabitant of the state shall go
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into any other jurisdiction to obtain a divorce for any
cause occu -ing within the state,

or if

a cause which

would not authorize a divorce by the lais of the state,
a divorce so obtained shall be of no effect in tjio state.
In all other cases, a divorce decreed in any other state
or country according to the laws thereof by a court
having jurisdiction of the case and of the parties, is
valid in said states.
In Indiana it is declared without qualification,
"Adivorce decreed in any other state by a court having
jurisdiction thereof, shall have full effect in this
state."
We do not find much difference

in

the statutes

as to the causes of diyorce, but we do find courts in
the jurisdictions ruling as to whether specified acts
are cruelty, or whether there is a desertion or not, and
this is one great factor that has produced such inharmonious results.

Some of the most ridiculous causes

are sustained by the courts under the head of desertion.
In the report of the Commissioner of Labor 1889, which
contains an investigation made by that department into
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the marriage and divorce
States,

legislation of the United

there are a number of exampl,-s given where the

court has

,rarnted a

divorce

such as:

"Because husband entered L

navy.*

"Because defendent treats this plaintiff
great and

,rnmcrited contei.vt having; said to her,

.iitu

l did

not c .e whether she left him or not.*
"During our whole married life my husband has
never offered to take me out riding; this has been a
source of great mental suffering and injury."
"Defendant uses such abusive language tnat it
makes the plaintiff sick and unable to attend to domestic
duties."
"Defendent violently upbraided plaintiff and
ssid to him 'You are no mun at 2.l,' thus causing him
mental se2Xring ard anguish."

"Defendent Said to Plaintiff, 'I care more for
.s little finger than for your whole body,' thereby
causing this plaintiff mental anguish and suffering."
"Defendant has beon guilt
in

of extreme cruelty

that shc has habituaily nglected and refused to cook
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for plaintiff and has several times slat in his face.9
"Defendant made plaintiff climb a ladder to
drive nails in the wood shed, not liking the way she
drove them, he lassoed her, on coming down from ihe ladd-T"
tied her fast to the gate

.Jost, then stuck stick2. and

stones in her nose and eyes and ears, g.ouged hiskauckles
in her 3ys, and said he wanted to see if she was Dutah.
On untieing her he threw or shoved her into a nest of
bees, -ll of which sorely grieved the plaintiff in body
and mind."

"
Thus the ruling of the courts as to just what

constitutes cruelty, and Just when desertion will be
presumed and the different spaces of absence required
by statute to constitute desertion, mk.

the only

mter-

ial differences between the laws.
This i,. on) of the
argument
strongest i A
for ,.lacing these matters in the JurisUnited States
diction of the 'ourts.
State courts will never be in
harmony on this nmtter.
the states as to just

This variance

in

the Thws of

what constitutes cruelty and

desertion gives rise to the grestest confusion.
A suit for divorce is

a proceeding sui generis

partly

in

,ersonarg and partlj

not strictly

of siich .
effects

rR.

ir1,

127412, the court sf.id " A suit

127 N. Y.,

tho;vr.

in

proceeding,

the ,arital

alimony cost,

it

fo:

procteding in raw, is
p,
or Quasi

atatus

in

Rem in

Rigley

vs

divorce

of Lhe nature

so far

of the parties,

-s

.. nda us

is a proceeding- in

it
bo the

Turner
Tarsoniam.

vs T-,.rnf.r 44 Ala 437; HaIrding vs Allen 9

lie 140.

We have seen that the position of a husbani.
and wife ds such towards

the corwnunity in

is ezAled their status.

An action brought by either

party to change this status
,o be

which they live

is an action in rem and is

Aistinguished from an action against the parties;

this

change would be an action in

pets~onam.

nent

in

alimony costs and

personam is

one decreeirc

probably the custody of children.

A judge-

Every state has the

unqualified right to control the domestic status
who reside therein.
Now if

Strader vs Grabiia-i

husband and wife yhave domiciles

states there are two res.
ive jurisdiction
"Jurisdiction

of the

10 HowarJ) 329.
in

separate

Each state would have exclus-

status of

to pass decree

of those

in

1t:; own citizen.

rem exists ov.? anything
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fixed in the state."

Story Conf. L. see. 549--592.

Thus one gaining a residence in v state has a right to
have the courts thereof declare his status and this right
gives rise to a situation that is the greatest stain on
the legislation of the United States.

What an easy

matter for a dissatisfied party to a marriage, who has
no graounds for a divorce under the laws of his own
domicile, to step into a state having less stringent
rules, claim a residence and gain a divorce.

It is

done every day and is in direct violation of the law of
the real domicile.
In such cases an action amounts to no more or
less than an ex-party application for divorce.

The

attempted service of process on the defendant without
the jurisdiction, is a mere farce, the court compelling
the complainant to publish a summons, and a few jurisdictions require a copy mailed to the defendant.
Presence or absence of the defendant is of no moment,
and the court proceeds with the apology that it is merely
declaring the status of one of its citizens.

Very true,

but is not the result to determine the sitizen of another
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state also?

Is not this court taking a right from a

person without its Jurisdiction, without due process of
law?

It would seem not from the decisions, but good

cormion sense suggests that the custom is contrary to
justice and in direct violation of the constitution of
the United States.

How does the situation of the party

who is thus unknowingly divorced differ from one who is
divorced after being heard?

If it be a wife she is

deprived of support whie yet a wife.

If the husband

returns ho may marry and has all right to cohabit with
the second wife, while the first wife must proceed in
court to obtain a regular divorce from her husband before
remarrying, otherwise she is guilty of adultery and
bigamy.

The People vs Baker 76 N. Y., 78.

"THe

indictment charged, and the evidence on the part of the
prosecution tended to show, that in the year 1871 defendant in error was married to one Sallie West, in the
State of Ohio, and that in November, 1874, while she was
still living, he married one Eunice Nelson, at Aiburn,
this Saate.
The defendant in error offered in evidence an
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exemplified copy of the record of a judgement in the
Court of Cormmon Pleas, of the County of Seneca, State of
Ohio, in an action by said Sallie against him for divorce.
The record showed proof of service of p rocess on defendant by publication;
him.

there was no personnel appearance by

The judgement purported to dissolve the marriage

on the ground of'gross neglect of duty,' on his part".
The defendant was held to be guil;y of bigamy and was
imprisoned for the crime.

This opinion has cost con-

siderable comment, but has been upheld by several of
the states.

In Jackson vs Jackson 1 Jhs 424, the wife

obtained ex-party divorce in Vermont, on the ground of
ill treatment and severe temper, from her husband then a
resident of New York.

Then she returned to New York, b

brought action on the Judgement obtained in Vermont for
alimony adjudged her by the court in Vermont.

The

court held that the domicile of the party was not changed
by her going and residing in Vermont, that such conduct
was an

nvasion of the law of the state which does not

allow a divorce except for adultery, and that no action
could be maintained on such a decree.
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A nice argument arises in this connection as
to the domicile of the wife when the husband has gone
to another state.

The old common law rule says that

the husband could fix the domicile of the wife, that his
domicile was hers; he might move as often as he pleased
E.nd his wife must follow.

Whether sho actually follow-

ed, or not, did not matter since her domicile necessarily followed.

This is still the law, the domicile of

the hkusbnd is the domicile of the wife.

The courts

get around this by saying the identity of the wife's
domicile with her husband's is, after all, but a legal
fiction.

Hunt vs Hunt 72 N. Y. 217; Colvin vs Reed

55 Pa., St., 375.

the wronged wife who is without

fault may proceed against her husband where she is in
fact, domiciled.

California, Dakota, Idaho, Nebraska,

Kansas, New York, Ohio and Wyoming provide by statiite
in effect that if a married woman dwells in a state at
the time of bringing an action for divorce, she is
declared a resident thereof for the Vu';tose of such
action regardless of her husband's residence.

The court

in Hunt vs Hunt 72 N. Y. 218 said, "The domicile of a
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prima facie with that of a wife,

husband is

acquire a separate domicile whenever it

ehc mEy

is necessary

for her to do so, as where the parties ar. living apart
under a Judicial decree of separation ,
conduct

or when the

of the husband has been such as to entitle her

to a divorce absolute or limited by the necessity of its

exercise."

Burlen vs Shannon 115 Yass. 438.

M and D 221.

Cheever vs Wilson 9 Wal 103.

But if

she is

Stuart

in fault, her domicile re'rins

his and the court of his domicile may dissolve the
marriage status as to both of them.
There is
a state

some justice

in

the rule which permits

to divorce one party and not the

othmer,

for

instance, if the husband deserts the wife and goc.-; into
another state

solely to procure a divorce, his divorce

when obtained will not operate to defeat
the wife,

if the court had no jurisdiction

Ex-party divorces r

the rights of
over her.

those in which absentee may be

served with process by publication ar% advantageous

only

to secure rights of boni fide residence in the state in
which both parties are domiciled and continues in good
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faith to reside until one of the parties absents himself
not for the purpose of' obtainin(p a new residence,

but

for the solo purpose of obtaining a divorce.
Since ex-party divorces are xBX in some cases,
just and proper, it would not do for a state to refuse
to entertain them, but each state cu;.n adopt statutes
that will pervent abuse and in'osition in such suits.
New York and Vermont are the onl,1y states which have
statutes protecting the courts in such respects.
New York.-- "In an action for absolute divorce,
both parties must have been residents of the state when
the offense was committed;

or must have been married in

the state; or the pl intiff must have been a resident
when the offence was committed,
was commenced;

or the offence rmst have been commritted

within the state,

and the paintiff must be v resident

of the state when the action is
for limited divorce,
the action is
the state; or,

and also when the action

i

actions

both parties must bc rcsidents when

commenced;
if

commenced.

or nTust have been married in

married out of the state,

they must

have become residents thereof and continuecd to be such

at l.east one year, and the plaintiff mist be a resident
when the action is

c<,'rnicncd."

Vorrnont.-- "No divorce shall be decreed for
any cause if

an

the parties never lived tog :ther as iLubvnd

wife in this st ate; nor for a cause which accrued in

another state or country unless the p],-ties, before such
c-.use accrued,ilived together -.s husband. and wife in
this state ; nor for a cause which accrued in another
state or country, unless one of the parties then livAd
in this state."
The statute provides in Dakota that the plaintiff must have resided in the state ninty (90) days before institution of sui.t.

This being the shortest

residence actually required in any jurisdiction, the

state has become famous for its divorce colonies froni
the East.

Statutes in Arizona, Idaho, Neblaska, nevada,

New Mexico and Wyoming requir-e a boni fide residence of
six months beford suit.
five years.

Other states very from one to

It is noticed thet the Western states and

territories have the mosk lax laws as to resident
qualifications.
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The danger which may arise under a lax law
especially so far as residence and causes are concerned,
is well illustrated by the divorce legislation in Utah,
as will be seen by its history.

The first divorce law

of Utah was passed by the legislature March 6, 1852.

It

vested the jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to
divorces and alimony in the Probate Courts.

This law

of 1852 containedglaring defects, the first regarding
the residence of the parties seeking a divorce, and the
second relative to the insufficiency of the alleged
causes of action.

The complainant in a divorce need

not have been a boni fide resident of the territory.
The formal expression of an intention to become a resident was all that was required.

The plea of a citizen

of any part of the United States that he intended to
become a citizen of Utah was entertained equally with
that of a regularly domiciled resident.

In general the

grounds upon which a decree of divorce dould be made were
the same as in other parts of the Union, but it was
enacted that when it could be made to appear to the
satisfaction and conviction of the court that the parties
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can not live together in peace and union, and that their
wellfare and happiness require a separation, a decree
might be rendered.

The probate courts of three count-

ies became almost literally bureaus of divorce.

They

were the dumping ground for fradulent suits from the
East.

The returns from one county show a total of 691

divorce decrees during twenty years.

Of th~s@ 619

cases, less than 75 belonged to the county itself.
The remaining 600 and more were from all parts of the
country, and came to this particular court through
attorneys in Chicago, Cinminnati, and new York, whose
offices were so flooded with business for the the Utah
courts that they made use of printed forms for both
petition and decree.

The petition had a blank space

for names, dates, and localities, and the recital of
special grievances, while the items of a general nature
were in print as, for instance, *Plaintiff wishes to
become a resident of Utah;'but is so situated that he
cannot at present carry his desire in this respect into
effect.

"The parties can not live together in peace

and union, and their wellfare and happiness require a

36
separation.*

In order to avoid suspicion, the county

newspaper in which publication of notice was ordered to
be made published a special edition, containing one or
more sheets of notices of suits pending and suxroning
the defendant to appear.

This special edition, it is

needless to remark, never got into circulation in the
c onmiuni t y.
The divorce laws of this state were amended
in 1878, providing that plaintiff must have resided one
year in state before institution of suit.
Edrunds --

By the

Tucker law, which went into effect in 1887,

the jurisdiction in divorce cases was removed from the
probate courts in Utah and vested in the United States
district sourts.

